Volume 2: Handbook of Social Choice & Welfare, 1st Edition

Key Features

Description

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define.  Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. 

Readership

Graduate students and professors worldwide working in all subdisciplines of economics and finance.

Handbook of Social Choice & Welfare, 1st Edition

Preface to Volume 2.
Introduction.
Part 5: Foundations.
13. Functions of social choice theory (K. Arrow).
14. Informational basis of social choice theory (A. Sen).
15. Competitive market mechanism as a social choice procedure (P. Hammond).
16. Functionings and Capabilities (K. Basu, L.F. López-Calva).
Part 6: Developments of the basic arrovian schemes.
17. Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains (M. LeBreton, J. Weymark).
18. Topological theories of social choice (N. Baigent).
19. Non-binary social choice theory (R. Deb).
Part 7: Non-welfaristic issues in social choice.
20. Social choice with fuzzy preferences (M. Salles, C.R. Barrett).
21. Fair Allocation Rules (W. Thompson)
22. Compensation and responsibility (M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet).
23. Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness (K. Suzumura)
24. Freedom, opportunity and well-being (J. Foster).
Part 8: Voting, manipulation and fairness.
25. Strategy proofness (S. Barbera).
26. Probabilistic and spatial models of voting (P. Coughlin).
27. Geometry of voting (D. Saari).